Source: http://kerry.senate.gov
After months of haggling, praying, fearing, hoping, threatening and cajoling, the Senate version of a comprehensive climate and energy bill was finally released just yesterday by US Senators Joe Liebermann (an Independent from Connecticut) and John Kerry (a Democrat from Massachusetts). The draft bill — no doubt close to the outer limit of the politically feasible in the current US domestic political climate and carefully calibrated to reconcile many diverging domestic views and competing lobbies — is nevertheless a disappointment, particularly for those hoping for a significant commitment of the United States to contribute to international adaptation efforts.
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U04UOwkX2r4[/youtube]
Aptly named the American Power Act (APA), the 987-page behemoth only in a short section and one subtitle in few words mentions international adaptation and instead underscores national interests over international cooperation. Indeed, a 4-page summary of the main sponsors reads more like a glossy sales brochure intend on convincing the American voter that the far-reaching climate and energy legislation proposal will benefit the American consumer, secure American leadership in global climate policy, increase American energy independence and overall ensure the continuation of the American way of life — no word about American responsibility (if one believes in the polluter-pays-principle) to help those people and countries most severely affected by global climate change.
I am not suggesting here that Senators Lieberman and Kerry are narrow-minded US nationalists. Quite the contrary. Both Senators probably belong to the relatively small group of US legislators who believe in multilateralism and recognize an American duty to act internationally in all climate matters. Nevertheless, it is a worrisome sign of the status of American public sentiment and the realities of US domestic politics that climate aid and US international solidarity don’t even make the summary-list of what is desirable in an American climate and energy bill.
Ultimately, the Senate version of the American Power Act does allow for the provision of some financial support for adaptation efforts, both domestically and internationally, with the money to come from the selling of greenhouse gas emission allowances under an US cap-and-trade system. Unfortunately, the allocation of funding for adaptation is not to start until 2019, when domestic and international adaptation efforts will equally share in the 1.5 percent of the revenue of allowance sales allocated for this purpose. This is to rise to 6 percent total, meaning 3 percent for international adaptation, by 2034.
Disappointed US commentators in a first quick-and-dirty analysis of the draft have pointed out that no resources are assigned for the protection of tropical forests (REDD) under this legislation and have urged to use the draft only as a starting point for a discussion on a final bill that will ultimately deliver more. Following the “American Power” phraseology, it does not surprise that even international development champion Oxfam America had to cushion its careful critique of the meager international adaptation commitments in pointing out the likely job benefits for Americans by investing in climate-resilient development abroad. Again, any reference to American responsibility as well as capability to assume her share of global burden sharing is amiss from the Senate version.
The Senate draft provides significantly less for adaptation purposes than in the House bill (H.R. 2454), passed last June, which also would start allocating funds sooner. Under the House-passed bill, 1 percent of allowances would be allocated to international adaptation from 2012 to 2021, then increase to 2 percent from 2022 to 2026 and then to 4 percent from 2027 through 2050 (with an equal amount for US domestic natural resource protection). US conservationists had estimated that the Senate bill, if passed in the current form, could generate on average US$1.2 billion annually through 2030, while the House-passed version would equal roughly $1.7 billion annually for both international and domestic adaptation efforts.
Of course, it is far from certain that the Lieberman-Kerry-Legislation will muster the filibuster-proof majority of 60 votes needed in the Senate to go forward. If against all odds it does, then the Senate version and last year’s House Bill will have to be reconciled. One would hope that a final outcome will be closer to the more progressive House Bill. At least it considers international adaptation efforts to be important enough within an American energy and climate bill to warrant its own sub-chapter with 20 pages of definitions, commitments and instructions, even if only very far at the end (on pp. 1365-1385 of a total of 1428).
Tags: adaptation, climate finance, USA
